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“Auditor Independence”
By Bishop C. Hunt
As an economist who has pursued some interest in the develop
ment of English company organization and control, I venture to
comment on several matters discussed in a recent article in The
Journal of Accountancy by A. C. Littleton entitled “Auditor
Independence.” In the first place, I think his views of English
practice are mistaken. Secondly, while I have no doubt that he
has the best interests of the profession at heart, I am convinced
that his proposals for the organization of audit practice and prac
titioners are unsound, not only from the point of view of the
progressive development of accountancy in this country, but as
well, from that of the security of shareholders for which we are all
solicitous. If adopted, they would, in my judgment, bind ac
countancy in the fetters of an inevitably mediocre bureaucracy.
It will be worth while to take a brief glance at the evolution of
the English law in the matter. “ Periodical accounts,” Gladstone
declared in 1844, “if honestly made and fairly audited can not
fail to excite attention to the real state of [a] concern.” In ac
cordance with this view, all joint-stock companies formed under
the registration and regulation act of that year, were required,
as a prerequisite of legal sanction to do business, to appoint
auditors “to receive and examine the accounts.” Directors were
to cause “A full and fair balance-sheet to be made up” and to
approve it before delivery to auditors. Similar provisions were
included in the act of 1845 to govern companies established by
special act of parliament. Auditors, it is interesting to note in
passing, were empowered to employ the assistance of professional
accountants. The compulsory requirement of audit was dropped
in the effective general statutes for the incorporation of com
panies with limited liability, those of 1856 and 1862. However,
the provision was retained in the model (and optional) constitu
tion for such companies, set up in table A of the act of 1862 and
probably adopted by a majority of concerns. Compulsory and
independent audit for banks was legislated in 1879. Under the
combined influence of a growing complexity of accounts and fear
of penalties, practice gradually substituted the professional for
the lay auditor so that by the act of 1900, under which the ap453
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pointment of auditors became compulsory for all companies, the
accounts of most of them were not only audited but were in fact
audited by chartered accountants (cf. The Accountant, Vol. XXVI
[1900], p. 475). Indeed, practice has generally outrun legal
minima. The stiffening of requirements over the years has, in
fact, merely translated into statute the best of the current pro
fessional practice.
Undoubtedly, the most important characteristic of English
company law and practice today is the position of the auditor.
With relation both to shareholders and to directors, he occupies
an independent status. Appointed by the annual general meet
ing of shareholders, he may be neither an officer nor a director of
the company nor an employee of any director or officer. He may
not be indemnified by the articles of a company for negligence or
breach of trust. He is liable to proceedings for misfeasance, in
the same fashion as directors. He is entitled to attend and to
address any general meeting of shareholders before which ac
counts are to be laid. It is also to be mentioned that the board
of trade may appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of any
company upon the application of members holding 10 per cent
of the shares issued, if it is supported by evidence showing good
reason and the absence of "malicious motives.”
The lack of auditor independence in England which Mr. Little
ton alleges, and in which he seems to find an important argument
for the nationalization of the profession in our own country, will
be found on adequate acquaintance with the facts of English
business life to be insignificant. In the first place, an auditor is
obliged by law to state in his certificate whether directors have
satisfied his requirements as to information. If they had not, it
is fair to say, I think, that in the great majority of cases he would
refuse to certify. At least seven days in advance of the general
meeting before which they are to be laid, a copy of the balancesheet and auditors’ report must be sent to all shareholders en
titled to attend. To put it mildly, directors would be under some
embarrassment if they had to confront such a meeting of English
shareholders without their auditor’s certificate, to say nothing of
the effect upon the company’s credit. As already pointed out,
auditors may, as of right, attend and address the general meeting
before which accounts are laid. In other words, they have a right
to be heard before being dropped. Furthermore, in view of the
exacting standards of professional ethics among members of the
454
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great societies of accountants, it would be difficult, to say the
least, to fill the places of auditors who had retired on the score of
pressure from directors to slight their duties, and such pressure
would in the vast majority of cases lead to resignation. No firm
of any reputation would consider appointment in the room of
others without consultation first on the circumstances of with
drawal or dismissal with those who had retired. The existence of
a high degree of professional comity in such matters is not to be
overlooked. Moreover, it does not embroider the facts to say
that the accounts of the great majority of the large public com
panies—those which appeal to the market for capital and whose
incidents of ownership are widely diffused—are audited by ac
countants of high calibre. Despite the circumstance, then, that
directors in office may in some cases dominate a meeting of share
holders and so nominate auditors indirectly, the general standards
of the profession are a sufficient realistic safeguard of auditor
independence.
While auditor independence is not, therefore, an issue in Eng
lish company regulation, the requirements as to disclosure of
accounting results are admittedly inadequate, and practice in
this matter both as to form and content suffers by comparison
with the best which prevails in the United States. Although the
reforms of 1928 were a considerable advance, they left serious
lacunae. Much information, the publication of which the law
might reasonably require, remains cloaked in “Victorian gar
ments of secrecy.” Published accounts are indeed often “a
model of obscurity” (see my article in Harvard Business Review,
January, 1930). Forward-looking accountants (and others) are
convinced that the requirements as to publicity should be broad
ened, for unfortunately the irreducible minima prescribed by law
become maxima in practice. However, as far as the prerogatives
of the auditor are concerned, it must be remembered that “the
responsibility for public accounts lies with the directors . . .
and so long as the accounts comply with the minimum legal
standard of disclosure the auditor has no official power whatever
to interfere with the discretion of the board” (cf. The Accountant,
April 16, 1932).
Mr. Littleton, further, argues from circumscription of auditors’
duties by the English courts. In view of the fact that legislative
prescription of those duties, beyond a generalization that they
shall report whether or not the balance-sheet “is properly drawn
455

The Journal of Accountancy

up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the com
pany’s affairs,” whatever that may be, is conspicuously absent
from the statute book, it is fair to inquire what guide-posts have
emerged from litigation. A classic dictum reads: “It is the duty
of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that
skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and
cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable care, skill and
caution must depend upon the particular circumstances of each
case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, ... to ap
proach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that
there is something wrong. He is a watch dog, but not a blood
hound” (Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co.). This, it would seem, is
broad enough to catch within its net a multitude of sins and yet
not place impossible burdens upon the profession. (For a recent
case of misfeasance which cost an auditor upwards of £8,000, see
in re Fulton & Co., [1932]). But perhaps the decision in re London
General Bank is in the minds of the authors whom Mr. Littleton
cites. From that case we have it that “it is no part of an audi
tor’s duty to give advice either to directors or shareholders as to
what they ought to do”; he has nothing to do with the way in
which the business is carried on. While I would not like to ex
press agreement with all the implications involved, I do think that
this decision points to the essential, if sometimes forgotten, fact
that the accounts of a company are the accounts of directors and
that the primary responsibility for them is theirs, a responsibility,
moreover, that should in no circumstances be weakened or shifted
to auditors. Let us be reminded of the original meaning of the
word audit: “the hearing of explanations from the person render
ing the account.”
The legislature has in fact always refused a detailed or “castiron statutory” definition of auditors’ powers and duties. De
spite urging from various quarters, the most recent committee on
company law reform (1925-26) again declined to recommend such,
holding it better that “the law should retain its elasticity in this
respect than that an attempt should be made to confine it within
the bounds of a rigid formula.” Wisdom and experience are
embodied in this view. As it was argued before the committee,
“a list of duties always leaves something in the air . . . the
auditor might say, ‘ That is not in the statute, therefore I do not
propose to do it.’ . . . The cases vary so enormously that what
is applicable in one is not applicable in another.” Or, as a presi
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dent of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (H. L. H. Hill)
has since observed: “I believe that the time will never come when
legislation can be so definite and comprehensive that auditors
will be reduced to mere automata, to obey audit programmes laid
down by statute. The whole value of our work is dependent
upon our proper exercise of judgment” (The Accountant, January
9, 1932). “In our professional life proper conduct has not been
brought about and can not be brought about by legislation”
(The Accountant, May 7, 1932). It is also of interest to mention
that a committee of the board of trade on the registration of
accountants refused, in 1930, to recommend such registration, in
spite of the fact that the companies’ acts do not require auditors
of public companies to have any special qualifications. The
committee found no evidence to show that any useful purpose
would be served.
Mr. Littleton finds a necessity for an “American plan to fit
American conditions.” It strikes an American as peculiarly odd
that he should overlook the admirably poised, if not altogether
infallible, system of checks and balances which inheres in English
audit practice, not to mention its happy characteristics of elas
ticity and freedom for the exercise of that judgment so necessary
in the practice of public accounting. Strangely, he offers in
alternative a proposal for the regimentation of the profession
and practice from which, so far as I can see, anything in the nature
of check and balance is conspicuously absent—a scheme fraught
with danger from several points of view, not the least of which is
that it would be apt to create in the minds of directors and in
vestors “the feeling that the state is the chief mentor of the one
and the guardian of the other.” Under his plan, all statements
submitted to the securities commission are to be certified only by
licensed auditors whose tenure is subject only to a governmental
board of review charged with the responsibility of their appoint
ment and discipline, of defining their duties, and, as well, em
powered to adjudicate and officially to pronounce upon con
troverted questions of accounting theory and practice. Such a
board, it is argued, would under the afflatus of high position,
plus a not inconsiderable lure of fat pensions, draw to its member
ship personnel of the highest calibre professionally and of utter
devotion to the common weal.
In the first place, is it presumptuous to inquire what there is in
the past experience of our country, or in the visible future, which
457
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would guaranty that appointments to (or under) such a commis
sion would be free from political interference (what, then, of that
independence so desirable in an auditor?), or that it would attract
the best of our accounting intelligence? It would seem that
there is only one answer: an emphatic “No.” Next, in the case
of controversy between a corporation and licensed auditors (and
what possibilities thereof!), the dice seem to be loaded in favor of
the latter and of the particular views of the board. In common
matters of accounting policy, there is more often than not room
for a legitimate and, indeed, wide diversity of opinions—any one
of which could perhaps be reasonably supported. A company
might be forced to accept a decision from Washington against its
own best judgment and that of its accounting advisors. Can it
be maintained seriously that holy writ in a matter such as ob
solescence, for example, sanctified as administrative law by such a
body, would necessarily be the part of wisdom? There is in
accounting, peculiarly, a broad area of “scientific guesswork.”
It is preposterous to suppose either that the responsibility there
for can be shifted to the shoulders of civil servants or that by so
doing that area can be narrowed. Nor by attempting to do so
should investors be misled into thinking that it either can be or is
being done. And, even in routine matters of audit, I venture to
doubt whether an auditor labelled with the magic word “licensed ”
could attain superior results from their point of view.
No doubt under English practice when differences arise between
directors and auditors, the directors may in some cases exercise
considerable pressure to bring about acceptance of their views by
the auditors (see, for example, Minutes of evidence, company law
amendment committee [1926], QQ. 520; 3617-19). And, if the
directors are forceful, and not wholly wrong, and the auditors are
somewhat compliant, the results may be—indeed in some cases
clearly have been—prejudicial to the interests of the stockholders.
But this is merely to say that the system does not function per
fectly; and admitting this to be a fact, it is reasonably certain that
discussion between two parties, each possessing special experience
and each vested with definite powers and responsibilities, will, by
and large, produce better results than a bureaucratic control
which in actual practice is apt to be exercised by persons of less
competence, acting with less sense of personal responsibility.
May I quote in conclusion, and in illustration of what I believe
to be the sound point of view in this whole matter a remark made
458
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a decade ago by Sir Josiah Stamp? It is well known that his dis
tinction is by no means confined to his own profession. “I
think,” he said, “accountancy will grow more by modifying con
ventions than by force of law.” As a recent example of this line
of advance, one may mention the form of auditors’ report, etc.,
developed as a result of cooperation between the American In
stitute of Accountants and the authorities of the stock exchange.
It called forth the following comment from the other side of the
Atlantic:
“ It is interesting to reflect that this result has been achieved by
cooperation between the expert interests affected, and that it has
not been necessary to invoke legislative sanction. It seems nat
ural to expect that the parties who have contributed to this
happy agreement will do their utmost to secure that American
business units and the American investing public shall under
stand the general nature of an audit and its inevitable limitations.
We rather envy our American cousins, too, on the score that the
cooperation which has resulted in the agreement can be used
advantageously if it should later appear that some amendment is
required. In that event, no such cumbersome machinery as par
liamentary action need to be invoked; the parties will again
confer, and if they again display the qualities of wise statesman
ship which their present action has revealed, they are likely to
have no difficulty in amending the result of their present labours”
(The Accountant, May 19, 1934).

The profession in this country is under challenge to resist any
attempt to have its freedom of development arrested, or its hands
shackled, in the course of the overemphasis on the prerogatives of
government which characterizes the hour.
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